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REFUSALS TO DEAL: THE SHERMAN
ANTITRUST ACT AND THE RIGHT TO
CUSTOMER SELECTION
ANTHONY S. Zrro, JR.*

Stimulated by the Industrial Revolution' and the burgeoning of urban America, 2 this country witnessed economic
growth so dynamic and powerful that it forever changed the
methods and practices of our nation's businesses. This great
spurt of economic activity brought huge gains in productivity
and profits. Accompanying these welcome monetary rewards,
however, was a form of business competition so keen and fierce
that the very free enterprise system in which competition is normally encouraged was threatened with collapse. Our current
3
antitrust laws evolved in this environment.
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A.,
J.D., L.L.M., Case-Western Reserve University. Member of the Ohio and Illinois Bars. The author wishes to acknowledge with sincere appreciation
the invaluable research assistance of Kenneth J. Nemec, Jr., senior law stuaient at The John Marshall Law School.
1. The term "Industrial Revolution" is usually applied to the social and
economic changes that mark the transition from a stable agricultural and
commercial society to a modern industrial society relying on complex machinery rather than tools. Historically, the term refers primarily to the period in British history from the middle of the eighteenth century to the
middle of the nineteenth century. However, the transformation of the
United States into an industrial nation took place largely after the Civil War
and lasted until about 1890.
2. Between 1880 and 1910 American cities grew dramatically in physical size and population due to a large rural-urban migration and foreign immigration. As a result, new markets for manufactured goods were created,
and the response to these demands carried the mixed commercial, manufacturing, and agrarian economy into the industrial environment we know
today, dominated by large mass-production corporations. See Z. MILLER,
THE URBANIZATION OF MODERN AMERICA, A BRIEF HISTORY 63-96 (1973).
3. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was the first congressional measure to prohibit trusts. The Act, based on the constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, declared illegal every contract,
combination (in the form of trust or otherwise), or conspiracy in restraint of
interstate and foreign trade. In 1914 the Clayton Antitrust Act was passed
to clarify and supplement the Sherman Act. The Clayton Act prohibited
exclusive sales contracts, local price cutting to freeze out competitors, rebates, interlocking directorates in corporations capitalized at one million
dollars or more in the same field of business, and intercorporate stock holdings. The Act also restricted use of the injunction against labor, and legalized peaceful strikes, picketing, and boycotts. The Federal Trade
Commission Act was also passed in 1914. This Act established the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) as an independent agency of the United States
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In an open and freely competitive society, the ideal policy of
the general law would be to encourage a person or corporation
in trade or commerce to exercise individual business judgment
in operating the business. It is fundamental to the maintenance
of this competitive system that such a trader be able to pursue
his business interests in light of his own analysis of the market
environment, and that his decision to deal or not to deal with
prospective customers reflect this analysis. However, it is
equally fundamental to the viability of such an economy that
purely arbitrary decisions of the trader must not be allowed to
interfere with another's legitimate business endeavors solely
because of the trader's superior economic strength and market
position. When a business failure is not directly attributable to
the operation of normal competitive activity, but rather to predatory objectives or conduct of another, the injury constitutes a
threat not only to the individual who is adversely affected, but
also to the system itself.4 It is through the legislation and interpretation of federal antitrust laws that this system of free and
5
open competition is safeguarded.
Of primary importance to a businessman 6 who is a member
of a trade or business group, either formal or constructive, is an
analysis of the antitrust laws' effect on his business and on implementation of his business decisions. By analyzing federal judicial treatment of the scope of the businessman's right to
customer selection, a better understanding may be gained not
only of the purpose and effect of the antitrust laws, but also of
indicators of future developments in the area of refusals to
deal.7 Moreover, this inquiry into a trader's right to refuse to
government charged with keeping American business competition free and
fair. The general duties of the FTC are to promote fair competition through

the enforcement of certain antitrust laws; to prevent false and deceptive
advertising; and to investigate the workings of business and keep Congress
and the public informed of the efficiency of such antitrust acts, as well as
practices that may call for further legislation.
4. If, because of the natural operations of competition, one is unable to

survive in his market due to inferior operational facilities or inefficient production or distribution systems, his failure should, in most instances, be
considered a manifestation of the viability and dynamics of the system itself, and should not be condemned by the general law as an injury to public

interest.
5. See notes 23-38 and accompanying text infra.
6. The terms "businessman" or "businessmen", as used in this article,
refer to both men and women in business and are used merely for ease of
reading.
7. Simple refusals to sell to others who do not maintain the first seller's
fixed resale prices have been held to be lawful; however, a seller cannot
consistently with the Sherman Act go beyond this right to refuse to deal if
aided by contracts or combinations, express or implied, that "unduly hinder
or obstruct the free and natural flow of commerce in the channels of interstate trade." FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922).
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deal (i.e., unilateral refusals to deal, self-restricting refusals to
deal, and group boycotts) will create a greater awareness of the
considerations that must be entertained by the businessman
before making vital decisions about potential customer selection.
This article will define what constitutes an illegal refusal to
deal under the Sherman Antitrust Act. An examination of the
Sherman Act and other relevant antitrust laws, coupled with a
detailed analysis of Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions interpreting these laws, will aid in this study. This discussion will provide the novice with a thorough understanding of
the problems and approaches that should be considered in the
area of antitrust law in general, and refusals to deal in particular.
ANTITRUST STATUTES

The concern of the United States government for preserving
the safeguards of free and open competition has been manifested in the legislation of several antitrust statutes, including
the Sherman Act,8 the Clayton Act,9 and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Act. 10 However, unlike actual terms in a
sale of goods, refusals to deal are not expressly governed by any
particular antitrust provisions. Instead, the ultimate determina12
tion of whether a concerted refusal to deal" or group boycott
is legal depends upon judicial interpretation of the Sherman
Act's provisions against agreements in restraint of trade 13 and
8. See note 3 supra.

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The term "concerted refusal to deal" has been defined as "an agreement by two or more persons not to do business with other individuals, or
to do business with them only on specified terms." Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d
606, 618 (8th Cir. 1976), citing Note, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under the
FederalAntitrust Laws, 71 HARv. L. REV. 1531 (1958).

12. The term "group boycott" has been referred to as "a refusal to deal
or an inducement of others not to deal or to have business relations with
tradesmen." Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 618 (8th Cir. 1976), citing Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 569, 580 n.49 (1964).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-

spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or

with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars

if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars,
or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
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against monopoly; 14 the Clayton Act's provisions against dis15
and the FTC
crimination in price and selection of customers;
16
Act's provisions against unfair competition.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act' 7 has been referred to in dicta
by the United States Supreme Court as making "the prohibitions of the Act all the more complete and perfect by embracing
all attempts to reach the end prohibited by the 1st section, that
is, restraints of trade, by any attempt to monopolize, or monopolization thereof."' 18 Moreover, in the area of concerted refusals
to deal, section 5 of the FTC Act 19 has been utilized by complainants where individual conduct or concerted conduct falls short
of being a Sherman Act violation but may, as a matter of law,
Section 3 of the same title provides:
Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United
States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such
Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and
any State or States or foreign nations, is declared illegal. Every person
who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or
conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or
by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punish-

ments, in the discretion of the court.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof,
shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) provides in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate
in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality, where either or any of the purchasers involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or
the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under
the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them ....

16. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1976) provides: "Unfair methods of competition
in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful."
17. See note 13 supra.
18. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911).
19. See note 16 supra.
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constitute an unfair method of competition prohibited by the
FTC Act. 20 The Supreme Court has considered the major purpose of the FTC Act to be enabling the FTC to restrain as unfair
practices which have not yet reached Sherman Act proportions,
but which would do so if left unrestrained. 21 Therefore, this
statutory provision, like section 2 of the Sherman Act, has become a catchall in the area of group boycotts where plaintiffs
have been unable to produce sufficient evidence to prove the re22
quired agreement under sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTES THROUGH JUDICIAL DECISIONS

The antitrust laws were intended to encourage, foster, and
protect the competition that is the foundation of our economic
life. In deciding whether a refusal to deal violates antitrust law,
the purpose, form, and effect of the challenged activity must be
examined. The Sherman Act generally does not reach refusals
to sell or buy which are completely arbitrary and isolated, for
such behavior is probably not pursuant to a conspiracy, nor
a scheme to monopolize, for it lacks the elewould it constitute
23
ment of intent.
20. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
21. Id. at 721 n.19 (although the FTC had found the existence of a combination, it did not mean that this was an indispensable ingredient of an unfair method of competition under the FTC Act). See also FTC v. Beech-Nut
Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 445 (1922).
Section 5 of the FTC Act is even broader than the Sherman Act because
it can permit prosecution of Sherman Act violations as violations of the FTC
Act's prohibition of unfair methods of competition, without some of the
Sherman Act violations. See FTC v. Sperry &Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,

244-45 n.5 (1972); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316, 320-22 (1966).
22. Section 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof of an agreement. How-

ever, courts have relaxed the traditional requirements of conspiracy when
considering alleged violations of § 1. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131,142 (1948) (an express agreement is not necessary in
order to find a conspiracy); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275
(1942) (an awareness of the general scope and purpose of the undertaking
was sufficient to find an unlawful conspiracy). Also, proof of a formal agreement is no longer required before an unlawful conspiracy can be established. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946)
(conspiracy proved by evidence of the action of the parties taken in concert); see also Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958) (where the court held evidence of a conspiracy could be established by showing that the defendant, knowing that con-

certed action was contemplated and invited, had participated in such

action).
23. Justice Holmes, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Swift &Co.
v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), enunciated best the importance of the
element of intent in determining whether there has been an attempt to mo-

nopolize:

Intent is almost essential to such a combination and is essential to such
an attempt [to monopolize]. Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent-for instance,
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Perhaps the earliest and most important judicial interpretation of the purview of the Sherman Act was made in United
States v. Colgate & Co. ,24 in which the Supreme Court made one
of the classic statements of the rule to be followed in the area of
refusals to deal:
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to ...preserve the right of free-

dom to trade. In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of a
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
independent discretion as to parties with
freely to exercise his
25 own
whom he will deal.

Colgate held that, absent monopoly, unilateral refusals to deal
are lawful, even if the actual or intended result would be unlawful if it were accomplished by agreement. 26 However, the courts
have taken a different, more critical approach to boycotts where
more than one party has been involved. 27 The distinguishing
feature of the group boycott cases is multilateral action to coerce third parties to conform, or to eliminate them from competition. In holding such concerted refusals to deal unlawful, the
courts have focused on the means used.2 8 When coercion is absent, a more liberal approach has generally been used.
After Colgate the courts began to construct what some consider to be a limitation on the absolute right of an individual to
buy from or sell to any person for any reason. 29 The courts began to interpret the Supreme Court's holding in light of the proviso that the absolute right of an individual to customer
selection existed "[i] n the absence of any purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly." 30 They recognized that although the

truly independent activity might in itself be legitimate in terms
of the reasons behind the antitrust law, this activity might be
only one small component of an overall scheme of business conduct that was directed toward, or resulted in, monopolization.
Since monopolization inherently implied injury to competition
and restraint of trade, the conduct in question must be within
the monopoly-but require further facts in addition to the mere forces

of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is
-

necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen. 196 U.S. at 396.

24. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
25. Id. at 307.

26. The absolute nature of this right was further demonstrated by the
Court's declaration that a trader could announce in advance the circum-

stances under which he would refuse to sell. Id.
27. See notes 67-86 and accompanying text infra.
28. See notes 100-14 and accompanying text infra.
29. See Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the FederalAntitrust Laws, 103
U. PA. L. REV. 847 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Barber].
30. United States v. Colgate &Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).

1981]

Refusals to Deal

the prohibition of section 2 of the Sherman Act.3 1 In adopting
this approach, the courts came to view section 2 as a catchall for
undesirable activity that would not, technically, fall within the
prohibitions of sections 1 and 3. Therefore, section 2 has been
construed as making the prohibitions of the Sherman Act more
complete by embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited
by the first and third sections, that is, restraints of trade by any
attempt to monopolize.
In Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 32 an early Sherman Act case
dealing with section 1, an association of manufacturers and dealers in tiles formed an agreement among its members not to
purchase materials from manufacturers who were not members
of the association, and not to sell unset tiles to nonmembers for
less than list prices, which were fifty percent higher than the
prices paid by members. Violations of the agreement rendered
the members subject to forfeiture of membership. The United
States Supreme Court held that the association constituted an
agreement or combination in restraint of trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act, and that plaintiff, an independent tile
dealer and competitor of certain members of the association,
was entitled to recover treble damages. 33 In 1914, the Court was
asked to determine whether an arrangement between certain retail lumbermen's associations regarding their relations with
wholesale dealers amounted to a combination and conspiracy in
restraint of trade as proscribed by section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 34 The Court held the blacklisting procedure an illegal
agreement under section 1.
However, it was not until the landmark decision of Colgate
in 1919 that the Court recognized that the real issue in this area
was the extent to which one may control and dispose of his own
property, and acknowledged that one may not do so fraudu35
lently, collusively, or in unlawful combination with others.
31. See Barber, supra note 29, at 861-62.

32. 193 U.S. 38 (1904).
33. The rationale for the Court's holding was that plaintiffs could not be

forced to become members of the association merely to conduct business as
they had done before its organization by virtue of any stipulation in the
bylaws of the corporation. The Court also said that the amount of trade

among the parties was not material, implying that the broader injury to
competition was the evil to be prevented. Id. at 46.
34. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914).
35. Ultimately, the Court held that the indictment did not charge the
defendant with selling its products to dealers under an agreement as envis-

aged by Congress in the Sherman Act, and therefore the lower court's order
sustaining Colgate's demurrer was affirmed. In dicta, the Court said: "The
purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, contracts and combinations which probably would unduly interfere with the free exercise of
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The Court implied that any combination or conspiracy aimed at
coercing a third party into compliance with the group's wishes
smacked of an interference with freedom of trade, and was
therefore in violation of the Sherman Act. Although the Court
broadly affirmed the right to refuse to sell unilaterally, it also
clearly decided that the antitrust laws precluded combining
with others for the same purpose. The reluctance with which
the Court refused to find a violation of the law in a single concern's refusal to sell contrasts with the speed with which the
36
Court implied it would strike down a group boycott.
In these early cases the Supreme Court set the tone for future analysis of Sherman Act complaints and established the
pattern that a business or person acting alone had an absolute
right to choose those with whom he wished to buy and sell, in
the absence of special factors such as a monopolistic position in
the market. But the courts became very sensitive to the fact
that combination was an extremely useful tactic to accomplish
undesirable business objectives that could not be reached unilaterally. 37 While the independent refusal of one party to deal
with another might represent a stimulus to competition, the
joint efforts of more than one party to accomplish the same objective could easily impede or threaten the operation of competition, and consequently effect an undue restraint on trade.
After Colgate, the apparently clear statement of the Court
that individual customer selection was permissible began to undergo a process of confinement. Although the Court reaffirmed
the right to refuse to sell unilaterally, it also decided that the
antitrust laws precluded the combining of others for the same
purpose. The difficulty with this generalized approach was determining when this combination occurred. The focal question
became what guidelines or tests the courts could apply to determine when a combination had taken place. By looking to see
whether the refusal stemmed from group action (perhaps because of an assumption that group action is more effective),
courts began to have less difficulty in bringing refusals to deal
within the statutory prohibitions. Thus, the emphasis in many
cases following Colgate shifted from the refusal itself to the
agreement or combination.38
their rights by those engaged, or who wish to engage, in trade and commerce-in a word to preserve the right of freedom to trade." 250 U.S. at 307.
36. Id. at 307-08.

37. See note 38 infra.
38. In Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923), the
Supreme Court said that a combination or conspiracy could be formed with-

out any specific (formal) agreement on the part of the competitors. The
Court began to identify more clearly the agreement or conspiracy as the
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"ILLEGAL PER SE" AND "RULE OF REASON" CONCEPTS

Before attempting to ascertain what legal treatment will be
given under the Sherman Act to the relationship and actions of
two or more traders vis-a-vis third parties, one must first inquire
primary component of the restraint, and the refusal to deal became a manifestation of the primary agreement element. In 1930, in Paramount Famous
Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930), ten competitors in interstate commerce controlling 60% of the entire film industry agreed to restrict
their liberty of action by refusing to contract with exhibitors for the display
of motion pictures except on a standard form contract. This contract provided for compulsory joint action in respect to their dealings with one failing to observe the contract's provisions. The Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's decree of injunction against future action on the unlawful plan
on the theory that the necessary and inevitable result of such an agreement
was to restrain trade materially and unreasonably in violation of the Sherman Act. The Court once again emphasized that the purpose of the Act was
to protect the public against the evils commonly incident to the unreasonable destruction of competition-that the interest of the public in the preservation of competition was the primary consideration.
Perhaps the next major case in the logical line of decisions was Fashion
Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). Here, in a § 5
FTC Act proceeding the defendants, a combination of manufacturers of textiles used in women's garments, sought to suppress competition by others
who allegedly copied their designs and sold them at generally lower prices.
Defendants registered their designs and refused all sales to retailers and
manufacturers of garments who dealt in the copies or would not agree not
to sell them. The FTC concluded that the practices of the combination constituted an unfair method of competition tending to monopolize, and issued
a cease and desist order. Defendants claimed their methods were a necessary form of self help devised to prevent what they claimed to be activity
approaching a common law tort. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the FTC's
ruling, citing the power of the combination and the fact that its goal was the
intentional destruction of one type of manufacture and sale that was in
competition with the Guild and its members. This case further illustrated
the clear trend in judicial thinking supporting the proposition that competitors who combine in a refusal to sell do so at their own peril, and foreshadowed the tendency to condemn a coercive group boycott as illegal per se.
The more recent cases in the group boycott area show no tendency to
deviate from the well settled principles of judicial analysis discussed above.
The cases show a trend toward scrutinization of group activities geared to
accomplish certain economic objectives in light of the group's power, potential or real, in its particular market environment, and demonstrate a feeling
that size and economic strength of such groups are directly related to the
potential for interference with competition.
In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), Justice
Black, speaking for a unanimous Court, said that group boycotts were
within a class of restraints which were inherently unduly restrictive, and
that Congress has determined its own criteria of public injury as to them.
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders,
had long been regarded as being in a forbidden category, and were not
saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific circumstances. The activities of Broadway-Hale vis-a-vis Kor's were seen to interfere with the natural course of interstate commerce, and this would not be
tolerated merely because the victim was just one merchant whose business
was so small that its destruction would make little difference to the economy as a whole.
In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
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whether the activity constitutes an agreement, i.e., a contract,
combination, or conspiracy. If it is found that an agreement was
made, then the next question is whether this concerted action,
or group boycott, is an illegal restraint of trade. Two different
approaches to this problem have been adopted by the courts.
An understanding of them is fundamental to an analysis of the
past developments and future trends in the area of concerted
refusals to deal. These two methods are known as the "illegal
39
per se" and the "rule of reason" concepts.
(1961), the Supreme Court cited Klor's in overturning a Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmance of a district court decision dismissing plaintiff's
complaint. Here defendant American Gas Association (AGA) allegedly
combined to restrain interstate commerce in the manufacture, sale, and use
of gas burners in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court found a
conspiracy in the AGA's refusal to approve plaintiff's burners, and said that
this conspiratorial refusal fell within one of the "classes of restraints which
from its very 'nature' or 'character' was unduly restrictive." 364 US. at 659.
The trend in case development in this area is forecast by one of the
most recent cases, which indicates that the courts will continue to adhere
closely to the principles and guidelines established in cases already discussed. In Boise Cascade Int'l, Inc. v. Northern Minn. Pulpwood Producers
Ass'n, 294 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Minn. 1968), the Minnesota District Court followed the principle established in Colgate that any individual (operator)
acting alone and not in concert with others is free to sell his product or
labor to anyone he chooses at any price he cares to demand, or to withhold
his product from the market completely if he so desires. However, as to
defendants' claim that any group action resulting from their activity was the
result of an ad hoc group of individuals expressing common grievances
against a particular person (corporation), and not an association conducting a group boycott, the court said: "The statute, however, Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, requires no formal association but only a 'combination or
conspiracy' and this has always been interpreted to countenance some type
of agreement among the parties to the conspiracy or combination, whether
formal or informal." 294 F. Supp. at 1021. The court said that the major evil
at which the antitrust laws were aimed was a situation where two or more
individuals begin to act in concert, that is, jointly, in agreeing to withhold
their products from the market or a specific customer.
It thus appears that the crucial element that will make group behavior
violative of the antitrust laws is not the boycott or refusal in itself, but the
agreement, formal or constructive, utilized to make the business objectives
more easily attainable.
39. An act is illegal per se if it is known or proved to have occurred, and
it is declared illegal without an examination of its possible justifications.
The reasoning behind this is discussed by the Court in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977). See also Bork, The Rule
of Reason and the Per Se Concept. PriceFixing and Market Division 11, 75
YALE L.J. 373 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Bork]; Van Cise, The Future of Per
Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964); Note, Antitrust- Vertical
Restrictions--The Rule of Reason, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1240.
The rule of reason applies "where the restraints on trade and commerce have restrained competition but certain redeeming features exist
which save them from being conclusively presumed unreasonable. The
concerted conduct sought to be insulated from antitrust scrutiny must be
no more restrictive than necessary to achieve its legitimate purpose." Note,
Antitrust-Restraintof Trade-GroupBoycott-NFL College Draft, 15 DuQ.
L. REV. 747, 749 n.14 (1977).
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The Rule of Reason
Relative to section 1 of the Sherman Act, the rule of reason
was invoked for the first time by the United States Supreme
Court in 1911 in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States.4° The Court adopted this concept to provide some workable guidelines to determine what activity fell within the purpose and prohibitions of the law-what activity constituted a
sufficient restraint of trade or commerce 41 in a section 1 or 3
case-and clarified it by the following dicta:
[TIhe criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of
ascertaining whether violations of the section have been committed, is the rule of reason guided by the established law and by the
plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the act and thus the public
42
policy which its restrictions were obviously enacted to subserve.
This concept was applied in deciding at what point the actions of
a commercial entity exceed the bounds of acceptability or social
desirability. Consequently, the Court's reasoning seemed to indicate that even where the requisite group action was present,
the effects of the conduct would be analyzed to determine
whether its restraining characteristic was severe enough to
counterbalance any positive implications, for example, the
achievement of greater efficiency in performing valuable economic functions. All relevant factors, such as the relative economic strengths of the combining parties in the market in which
they operate, 43 and even the motives underlying their conduct,
would be considered. Only after these variables were considered would the Court determine whether the business activity
in question fell outside the ambit of desirable business conduct,
measured in light of the antitrust law policy to cultivate and protect competition.
The basic function of the rule of reason has been to serve as
a vehicle with which to interpret the ultimate effects of the challenged conduct. Where the court goes beyond the actual agreement of the parties, it will employ this rule to filter facts
pertaining not only to the agreement itself, but also to the rea40. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
41. A restraint of trade has been seen as embracing only "acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the

public interest by unduly restricting competition or unduly obstructing the
due course of trade. . . ." Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600, 610 (1914), citing Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Accord, Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373,
376 (1913).
42. 221 U.S. at 62.
43. See generally Comment, Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sherman
Act: Defendant's Market Power as a Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1451 (1973).
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sons for the agreement, its goals, its immediate effect, and the
long range and perhaps indirect effects the agreement will have
on the competitive structure of the market as a whole.44 Thus,
the objectives of the antitrust law of maintaining free and open
competition will be balanced against any positive effect the conduct may have, as a legitimate business function, on the particular market situation or the economy as a whole. If the
detrimental results of the activity outweigh the positive results,
45
the court will deem it illegal and order its discontinuance.
Illegal Per Se
By using the rule of reason the courts, in certain situations,
have been able to go behind or beyond the contract, combination, or conspiracy to analyze the facts, and then make the ulti46
mate decision whether the restraint will be declared illegal.
This determination has depended upon a balancing of interests
or competing values, in view of the objectives of the general law
and the specific antitrust statutes. 4 7 However, this detailed ex44. In Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918), Justice Brandeis provided this often-quoted rule of reason
standard:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
45. The use of the rule of reason is demonstrated in Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). The bylaws of the Associated Press (AP)
prohibited service of AP news to nonmembers, prohibited members from
furnishing spontaneous news to outsiders, and empowered members to
block membership applications of competitors. The Supreme Court, in finding these bylaws and the resulting conduct to be in violation of the Sherman Act as an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade, admitted that certain
restraints-e.g., a reporter's contract to deliver his news exclusively to a
single newspaper-might well be "reasonable" and therefore not within the
scope of the Sherman Act prohibitions. However, finding that individual
freedom to trade in news had been limited by the group compact, the Court
refused to regard the exclusionary provisions as illegal per se, and said that
the restraints must be judged only after the rule of reason had been applied. Ultimately, the rule of reason required the Court to weigh the advantages to the combining parties, flowing from their restraints, against the
conflicting interests of the public in freedom of opportunity and action.
Here, the Court found the balance to be in favor of the public interest, and
found the exclusionary provisions of the AP's bylaws to be an unlawful restraint.
46. Id.

47. However, reasonable restraints have been upheld despite some
risks of anticompetitive effects. In Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), Justice Brandeis stated that the Board's
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amination is not always made. In certain types of offenses, the
judicial investigation has not considered all relevant facts extraneous to the agreement itself. Many times, factors that might be
considered in arriving at a decision under the rule of reason are
ignored or presumed to exist. In these cases, as soon as the requisite agreement is proven, the activity will be considered illegal
48
per se.
The per se concept grew out of the price fixing conspiracies
of the 1920s, a time when the competitive nature of our economy
was threatened.49 By its purpose and effect, a per se offense includes certain forms of conduct that are conclusively presumed
to restrain trade unreasonably. This per se category of antitrust
violations consists of "agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming
virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
employment of the "call rule" (which prohibited Board members, until the
opening of the next trading session, from purchasing or offering to purchase
grain at a price other than that quoted at the close of the previous session)
was not an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade, and that
every agreement concerning trade must by its nature restrain. The Court
held that the true test of legality must be whether the restraint imposed
merely regulates, and thereby promotes competition, or whether is suppresses or destroys it. To determine that question, the Court should consider the facts peculiar to that business, the condition of the business
environment before the restraint was applied, and the nature and probable
effect of such a restraint.
48. In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959),
the Court said: "Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal
have long been held to be in the forbidden category."
This illegal per se approach to group activity has been used often by the
courts. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (joint
collaborative action by car dealers, associations, and GM to eliminate a
class of competitors held to be a conspiracy in restraint of trade); Evening
News Publishing Co. v. Allied Newspaper Carriers of N.J., 263 F.2d 715 (3d
Cir. 1959) (boycott by home newspaper delivery dealers to force a newspaper to eliminate newsboy home delivery constituted a restraint affecting interstate commerce); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. United Motion Picture
Theatre Owners, 93 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1937) (independent motion picture theater owners found to be carrying out an unlawful interstate combination in
restraint of trade by attempting to secure better contract terms with film
manufacturer and film distributor through use of advertising aimed at appealing to the public to support their cause).
49. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933)
(competing coal producers formed a corporation to act as their selling agent
with authority to set prices); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392 (1927) (competing manufacturers and distributors of sanitary pottery
entered an agreement to fix and maintain uniform prices); Board of Trade
of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (Court held that
the true test of whether an agreement that concerns or regulates trade is
illegal is to see whether the restraint is such as merely regulates, and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition).
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have caused or the business excuse for their use."5 0 Thus, use
of per se concepts limits the rule of reason approach, which
looks to the overall purpose and effect of the practices in51
volved.
A common element in many of the illegal per se cases is that
the immediate objective of the group boycott or refusal to deal
in question was either to compel the object of the boycott to
adopt a certain standard of trade practice, or to force such third
party out of business, and therefore out of competition with the
instigating group. 52 Such group action coercing outside parties
is deemed by its very nature to be an undue restraint of trade.
Whatever its purpose, it is likely to fall as illegal per se because
53
of its improper purpose or effects.
The Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints
An interesting analysis of the application of the illegal per
se and rule of reason concepts and the conflict they present
seeks to explain the problem in terms of the intended purpose
and actual immediate effect of the group boycott through a doctrine of ancillary restraints. 54 If the actual purpose or effect of
the group action is incidental or ancillary to a lawful transaction,
the restriction should be measured against the rule of reason to
determine its legality. Some of the criteria to be used would include the legitimacy, i.e., positive socioeconomic value, of the
principal transaction; whether the restraint is more oppressive
than necessary for the protection of the underlying relationship;
and whether the restriction is excessively injurious to the competitive structure of the market. In such business activity as an
exclusive dealing arrangement the purpose of the course of action is not primarily anticompetitive, but instead represents a
legitimate attempt to organize the most desirable and inexpen50. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).

51. See Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of
Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 569 (1964).

52. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
53. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
Klor's, a retail electrical appliance store, charged that Broadway-Hale, a de-

partment store chain operating an outlet next door to Klor's, was able by

virtue of its greater buying power to induce a concerted refusal to deal with
Klor's by major appliance manufacturers, so that they would sell to Klor's,
if at all, only on very unfavorable terms. The district court granted Broadway-Hale's motion for summary judgment, which was affirmed by the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court, in reversing and remanding,
found that the alleged conspiracy represented an illegal per se restraint of
trade. It is significant that nowhere in the opinion does the Court refer to
any limitations which would except a self-restricting, non-coercive refusal
to deal from the operation of the per se rule.
54. See generally Bork, supra note 39.
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sive method of distribution, and to compensate distributors for
concentrated effort by protecting them against competition from
their own products in a limited area. Although such agreements
might be called concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts, the
concept of ancillary restraint of trade comes into play and has
the effects of precluding a determination of illegality per se, and
requiring adoption of the rule of reason.
Applying the Reasonableness Test
The illegal per se and rule of reason concepts, as conduits
for judicial analysis of alleged group boycotts under the Sherman Act, represent a developing attitude toward what form of
group or combined behavior, which results in either a direct or
indirect restraint of trade, has sufficient economic implications
to require balancing the interests of the parties against the anticompetitive prohibitory objectives of the antitrust law. Where
the primary objective or actual effect of the challenged group
conduct is to coerce a desired form of business conduct or to
eliminate competition, courts will generally ignore the actual
purpose or effect of the activity that might otherwise have a mitigating effect. The cases have indicated that where the primary
element of coercion is absent, wider limits will be set for judicial
55
inquiry before declaring such agreements illegal.
One of the basic considerations in applying the reasonableness test, or perhaps the crucial criterion used in deciding
whether inquiry will go further than a declaration of per se illegality, is the size and market power of the organization or group
in question, rather than the nature of the business affected. Perhaps where an enterprise controls a large portion of the market,
it must necessarily provide the means for all comers to be
served or be found guilty of violating the Sherman Act. It appears that the greater the group's potential for damage or injury
to competition, the more restricted will be the judicial approach
to determining the legality of the behavior on the basis of its
actual results.
In considering these two approaches to sections 1 and 3 of
the Sherman Act, it is extremely important to realize that both
the rule of reason and illegal per se concepts are used as tools to
55. In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), the majority
implied that where powerful, although not necessarily dominant, interests
combine to prevent others from obtaining a certain commodity, or conversely from selling such a commodity, for the purpose of restricting competition, resulting injury to the public will be conclusively presumed. A
reasonableness test should only be employed for agreements on a smaller

scale.
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implement the objectives of the antitrust laws. 56 If the group
activity results in a passive restraint of trade, where the element
of direct coercion or purpose to coerce is absent and the combination is employed to further legitimate goals and business interests of the parties directly, the resulting indirect or ancillary
restraint of trade and competition will be more liberally interpreted. However, where the combination is deemed to involve
an attempt by two or more parties to avoid dealing with a third
party, with resulting foreclosure of access to or participation in
the perpetrators' market, the activity will be subject to much
closer scrutiny, and the courts will be very apt to give little or no
consideration to the actual, practical effect of the conduct in
question. An attorney must be prepared to meet the illegal per
se obstacle if he wishes to invoke a complete court analysis of a
defendant's conduct.
UNILATERAL REFUSAL TO DEAL

Before analyzing the effect of the antitrust laws on group
boycotts, it is first necessary to understand what, if any, limits
are placed on the activity of an individual trader in commerce in
a purely independent and unilateral implementation of a selective or restrictive sales or distribution plan. The first and third
sections of the Sherman Act appear to prohibit only the combined activity of two or more parties which results in a restraint
of trade or commerce. This combined activity was the primary
evil toward which the Sherman Act was directed.5 7 The fear of
economic strength resulting from combination or agreement,
and the resulting potential for exertion of this power against a
third party as a threat to competition, was considered a threat to
the viability of the economy as a whole. However, totally autonomous activity did not pose the same threat, and indeed was
considered the ultimate value to be cultivated and protected.
Congress thought the free and open exercise of independent
business judgment8 was the very foundation of the competitive
5
economic system.
56. In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pa., 1973-1 Trade
Cases (CCH) 1 74,596 (3d Cir. 1973), the court stated: "The antitrust laws
... protect competition, not competitors; and stiff competition is encouraged, not condemned."
57. See notes 24-31 and accompanying text supra.
58. "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the (Sherman Act] does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). See Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945); United States v. Bausch &Lomb Optical
Co., 321 U.S. 707, 721-23 (1944).
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One of the initial cases which tested a unilateral or independent refusal to deal under section 2 was Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. 59 Kodak cut off supplies to
Southern Photo, an established Kodak dealer, after Kodak acquired control of a competing supply house and unsuccessfully
attempted to purchase Southern's business. Southern Photo alleged that this refusal to deal with it was in pursuance of a monopoly, and therefore a violation of the Sherman Act. In finding
Kodak to be in violation of the Act, the Court found that the defendant's action, although technically unilateral, was a prohibited attempt at monopolization. Once this scheme was
established, it was necessary only to connect Kodak's refusal to
deal with the illegal scheme to establish plaintiff's right to re60
lief.
Another demonstration of how an attempt to monopolize
will bring an otherwise legitimate unilateral refusal to deal
within the scope of the antitrust laws can be seen in Lorain
Journal Co. v. United States.61 The Journal, a Lorain, Ohio
newspaper, attempted to use its powerful position as the only
daily publication in its immediate area to prevent a newly created local radio station from competing for advertising. The
Journal gave notice to local businesses that wished to advertise
in the paper that such advertising would not be accepted from
firms that also advertised on the radio station. The effectiveness
of this boycott threatened to force the station out of business,
and it brought suit against the paper alleging violation of the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court held that the Journal's
scheme constituted an unlawful attempt to monopolize under
section 2. The Court acknowledged the general right of a private
business concern to refuse to sell, but held that this was no defense, for its "exercise as a purposeful means of monopolizing
interstate commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Act. '6 2 Once
again, the Court addressed itself to a purely independent or unilateral refusal to deal, and found it illegal on the basis of the
overall scheme of monopoly that is prohibited by section 2. The
general guidelines established in these cases are followed today,
as illustrated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Six-Twenty-Nine Productions,Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc.63
59. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
60. "[A]lthough there was no direct evidence--as there could not well
be-that the defendant's refusal to sell to the plaintiff was in pursuance of a
purpose to monopolize, we think that the circumstances disclosed in the
evidence sufficiently tended to indicate such purposes ... " Id. at 375.
61. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
62. Id. at 155.
63. 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966).
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The court noted that the Supreme Court had firmly established
the principle that section 2 prohibits an enterprise from refusing
to deal with another business entity when the refusal is in fur64
therance of a plan to monopolize a relevant market.
It should be noted that the general economic and social desirability of encouraging, and therefore protecting, the general
right of an individual trader to complete customer selection has
been expressly stated in section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, which
contains the proviso that "nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in
commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide
transactions and not in restraint of trade. '65 This relatively recent amendment to the Clayton Act seems to be a congressional
mandate for the absolute exercise of business judgment by a
trader acting unilaterally and in the absence of undesirable monopolistic implications.
A trader can feel relatively sure that if his business judgment is challenged, his unilateral decision not to deal (buy or
sell) with a potential customer will stand up under judicial scrutiny as long as he is not in a monopolistic, or potentially monopolistic, market position. If he doesn't enter into an agreement,
i.e., is not party to a contract, combination, or conspiracy, his
business conduct should not be vulnerable to a successful Sherman Act prosecution. However, these considerations are obviously incomplete without a detailed consideration of what
constitutes the proscribed agreement under the Act.
GROUP BoYcoiTs OR CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL

Sherman Act and "Contract,Combination or Conspiracy"
The Sherman Act in sections 1 and 3 declares contracts,
combinations, and conspiracies that result in restraint of trade
to be illegal.66 One of the major obstacles in bringing an action
against another or others under these provisions has been the
difficulty in establishing that the defendant has, in fact, agreed
or conspired with another, manifested by a refusal to deal in restraint of trade.
64. The court noted that a complaint is sufficient to establish a cause of
action under § 2 of the Sherman Act if the "refusal of defendant to accept

advertising from plaintiff by setting up unreasonable standards or by adopting an arbitrary course of action is for the purpose of destroying plaintiff as
an agency and thereby furthering a course toward monopolization." Id. at
483.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
66. See note 13 supra.
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One of the predominant characteristics of the cases brought
under the Sherman Act is the inability of most plaintiffs to prove
that the defendant entered into a formal contract with another
to combine in refusing to deal with a third party. Indeed, in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,67 the United States
Supreme Court alluded to the fact that the government is rarely
aided by direct testimony in proving the element of agreement,
and must usually rely on the conduct of the alleged conspirators. Because of the obvious risks involved, it would be foolish
for a trader who desired to combine with another to agree formally to coerce a third party. Instead, such an agreement would
usually be made informally, and proof of such agreement frequently is difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, it is essential to
the understanding of such an agreement to note how plaintiffs
and the courts have implemented the prohibitions of the Sherman Act in the absence of a formal contract.
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'Association v. United
States6 8 presented the question of whether an arrangement
among various retail lumbermen's associations concerning their
dealings with wholesalers amounted to a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade, as proscribed by section 1 of the
Sherman Act.6 9 The government alleged that the defendants,
mainly retail lumber dealers in New York, New Jersey, and
other eastern states, had conspired to prevent wholesale dealers
from selling directly to consumers of lumber. The defendants
had circulated "official lists" whose purpose was to record the
names of dealers who did sell directly to consumers. If a wholesaler's name appeared on this list, the other members of the association would refuse to deal with him. The defendants
contended that no combination agreement under which such
concerted action was taken could be shown. In finding this business conduct illegal, the Court said that the agreement was difficult to prove by direct testimony, but could be inferred from the
things actually done. 70 Although the Court acknowledged that a
retail dealer has the unquestioned right to stop dealing with a
wholesaler for reasons sufficient to himself, a combination is not
within the spirit of free competition. An act which is harmless
67. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
68. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
69. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
70. The Court noted that the circulation of these reports not only tends

to directly restrain the freedom of commerce by preventing the listed dealers from entering into competition with retailers, but also tends to prevent
other retailers with no direct grievance against the listed wholesaler from

trading with him. This practice takes the case out of the normal and usual
agreements in aid of trade which may be found not to be within the act. 234
U.S. at 612.
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when done by one may become a public wrong when done by
71
many acting in concert.
In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,72 the District
Court for the Northern District of Texas restrained appellants
from continuing in combination or conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and from enforcing or renewing certain contracts found to have been entered in pursuance of the
conspiracy. The agreements involved distributors and exhibitors of motion pictures, and embodied restrictions against subsequent-run exhibitors in the admission prices to be charged for
certain films. The injunction restrained the distributors from
enforcing the restrictions in their licensing agreements. The
Supreme Court affirmed the injunction, holding that although
there was no direct testimony as to a formal agreement to restrain trade, the evidence was more than sufficient to support
the lower court's finding of a constructive agreement. This evidence included strong motives for the action of appellants, the
risk that lack of agreement would result in diversity of action,
and the lack of any persuasive explanation by appellants of the
singular unanimity of action by the distributors. 73 In view of the
appellants' unanimity, and the strong motive for it, the Court refused to speculate about whether there may have been other
more legitimate reasons for the action. The Court emphasized
appellants' failure to introduce testimony by their officers that
an agreement for concerned action had not been reached. Moreover, the Court said that an agreement to impose restrictions
upon subsequent-run exhibitors was not a prerequisite for finding an unlawful conspiracy. It was enough that the distributors
participated in the scheme knowing that concerted action was
71. Id. at 614, citing Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433, 440
(1910).
72. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
73. The Court ruled that the acceptance by competitors of an invitation
to participate in a plan which if carried out would result in restraint of trade

would be sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman
Act, regardless of whether a previous agreement between the competitors
had been made. Id. at 227.
See United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923)
(large manufacturers of linseed oil entered into an agreement for the
avowed purpose of substituting so-called "open competition" for normal
competition previously existing between them was in violation of Sherman
Act); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921)
(an "Open Competition Plan" whereby manufacturers of one-third of the
hardwood output in the country exchanged full details of their businesses

by use of a central office violated the Sherman Act); Lawler v. Loewe, 235
U.S. 522 (1915) (circulation of an "unfair dealers" list violative of Sherman
Act); Eastern States Retail Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600
(1914) (so-called official report circulated among members of an association
of retail dealers held within prohibitions of Sherman Act).
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contemplated and invited.74 Eastern States and Interstate Circuit indicate that courts have little difficulty in finding an agreement, even where there was no formal contract or even
discussion among the alleged wrongdoers.
Consciously Parallel
Eventually, courts began to adopt specific but generally flexible guidelines for approaching the agreement problem. These
guidelines were clearly defined in Norfolk Monument Co. v.
Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc,75 which involved an action
by a retail dealer in cemetery monuments against several cemeteries and manufacturers of monuments. The District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia held the evidence insufficient to
show concert of action or joint activity among the defendants
sufficient to invoke the prohibitions of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The court of appeals noted that no joint action was disclosed by the evidence in that there were no conferences, meetings, or other communications alleged or proved, and it
therefore affirmed the granting of defendants' motion for summary judgment.7 6 In a vigorous dissent, Judge Craven agreed
that "before it can be concluded that there has been a 'contract,
combination, or conspiracy' sufficient to invoke Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act, it must be found that there was an
'agreement' between two or more persons or corporations. '77
However, citing Interstate Circuit, he said that the real issue
was not necessarily whether there was any formal agreement,
but whether agreement could be found in consciously parallel
decisions by competitors to adopt substantially similar exclu78
sionary restrictions.
74. "It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and is often
formed without simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939).
75. 404 F.2d 1008 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 700
(1969).
76. Petitioner's writ of certiorari was granted and the Supreme Court

reversed, holding that the alleged conspiracy had not been conclusively disproved by pretrial discovery and there remained material issues of fact

which could only be resolved by a jury. 394 U.S. at 704.
77.
78.
among
nesses

404 F.2d 1008, 1011 (4th Cir. 1968).
Id. The term conscious parallelism refers to the common practice
firms in a concentrated industry of conducting their similar busiin a uniform manner, aware that their counterparts are pursuing the

same course of action. The result of such coordinated activity is the elimination of competition among the participants and the restraint of trade in

general. Though each collaborator may decide independently upon its own
course of action, any major decision takes into account the prospective re-

action of the other firms. Thus the decisions are in effect interdependent.
See Note, Conscious Parallelismand the Sherman Act: An Analysis and a
Proposal,30 VAND.L. REV. 1227 (1977). See generally Turner, The Definition
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Long before Norfolk Monument, the concept of conscious
parallelism became the crucial test in determining whether the
Sherman Act should be invoked in a case of alleged group boycott or refusal to deal. 79 The concept probably evolved because
of the above-mentioned difficulty in producing any concrete evidence of formal agreements to combine which eliminated or interfered with competition. The courts will weigh the evidence,
and if the facts are compelling, will infer an agreement from simultaneous and similar conduct by two or more traders in the
same or related markets vis-a-vis a third party.80 Consequently,
most plaintiffs' counselors must convince the court either that
there was an actual formal or informal agreement, or that the
defendants' methods and the actual effect thereof were so identical that the defendants' conduct must fall within the purview
81
of the Sherman Act to safeguard competition.
Establishingthe Agreement
Even in light of the broad scope of the conscious parallelism
approach, convincing a court that the activity of the defendants
was either precipitated or aided by an agreement is seldom
easy, as Theatre Enterprises,Inc. v. ParamountFilm Distributing
Corp.82 illustrates. In affirming a jury verdict for defendant respondents, the Supreme Court noted that the crucial issue was
whether respondents' conduct toward petitioner stemmed from
an independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.
The Court acknowledged that business behavior is admissible
circumstantial evidence from which the finder of fact might infer
agreement. However, the Court had never held that proof of
parallel business behavior, in itself, conclusively established
83
agreement and therefore a Sherman Act offense.
of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelismand Refusals

to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
79. In Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579, 583-84 (3d Cir. 1951), evi-

dence of conspiracy was found in participation in, or mere acquiescence in,
parallel business practices, even without a showing of invitation and acceptance.
80. Id.
81. If this attempt to convince the court of an existing agreement, either
formal or informal, or of consciously parallel behavior fails, the plaintiff
might still be left with a good argument under § 2 of the Sherman Act pertaining to monopolistic prohibitions, or the FTC Act's provisions against un-

fair competition.

82. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
83. "Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have
made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitudes toward conspiracy; but 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely." Id. at 541.
It should be noted that in the lower court each of the respondents denied the existence of any collaboration and introduced evidence of local
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Theatre Enterprises establishes a caveat to plaintiffs attempting to prosecute a section 1 or 3 Sherman Act action: Conscious parallelism, in itself, is not particularly meaningful, but
must be accompanied by additional facts. One writer concludes
that such parallel activity is not even valid evidence of agreement unless there are some additional facts indicating that the
decisions of the alleged coconspirators were interdependentthat the decisions were consistent with the individual self-inter84
ests of those concerned only if they all decided the same thing.
He argues that even identical prices may be consistent with independent competitive decisions, as might be the case in an oligopoly market under stable conditions.8 5 Identical prices, under
these circumstances, become suspicious only where prices have
remained stable or risen in the face of lessening demand or excess supply. Depending on surrounding economic factors such
as the market situation at the time and place of the alleged combination, conscious parallelism, at least in a price fixing context,8 6 might or might not reasonably imply an actual
agreement. It is conceivable that even identical business conduct may be completely devoid of any form of agreement where
a group of individual actions are simply well-informed independent responses to the same set of economic facts.
It is valid to base the legality of what might, on the surface,
seem to be conspiratorial group action on whether or not there
is an interdependence of decision in the price fixing situation.
conditions surrounding petitioner's operations which preclued it from being
successful. See generally Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL.
L. REV. 743 (1950).

84. See generally Turner, supra note 78.

85. The theory of oligopoly is that where only a few sellers have a large
share of the market, monopoly pricing will occur even though the dominant
sellers neither expressly agree on prices nor communicate with each other
about prices. See United States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 118 F.
Supp. 41, 49 (D. Del. 1953) (oligopoly consists of those situations where a
few sellers sell only a standardized product). For an excellent discussion of
the oligopoly theory see Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws. A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969). See also Levy, Some
Thoughts on "Antitrust Policy" and the Antitrust Community, 45 MINN. L.
REV. 963 (1961); Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REV. 745 (1949); Rostow, The New Sherman Act. A Positive
Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 567 (1947).
86. Price fixing refers to explicit agreements by independent or competing companies to fix prices in order to gain a superior market position. Compare United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (18
defendant railroads were found guilty of a restraint of trade under § 1 when
they created an association for the purpose of establishing uniform freight
rates to eliminate rate wars) with United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified & affid, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (six produ-

cers of iron pipe were found guilty of price fixing when they agreed among
themselves to divide their markets into regional monopolies to avoid ruinous price competition in the industry).
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Here, as already suggested, the nature of the market itself may
require that some or all companies charge identical or substantially similar prices. In such circumstances, it might appear that
such similar conduct implies a consciously parallel scheme of
action, and that such informal agreement clearly falls within the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act. However, upon closer analysis, the trained observer might conclude that the action by the
alleged wrongdoers was required by the market situation, and
that the end results are the nurturing and stimulating of competition-a socioeconomically desirable goal. Some of the arguments made in support of limiting the conscious parallelism
theory might not be as valid in the context of a refusal to deal as
in price fixing. It seems much more difficult to say that several
companies or persons simultaneously refusing to buy from or
sell to a particular party can be considered to have come coincidentally to the same conclusion about the efficacy of coercing or
eliminating the same third party.
The question of exactly what behavior constitutes combination or conspiracy as it is used in the Sherman Act has been the
subject of much judicial inquiry since the Act's passage. Since
an actual contract aimed at combining efforts in refusing to deal
with a third party seems to define agreement, and thus implement the antitrust law, it is of critical importance to understand
what effect the courts will give to business conduct in the future.
As this discussion has attempted to illustrate, courts have heretofore avoided creating any rigid definitions or categories of conduct constituting group activity that must be deemed illegal.
Within the limits of stare decisis, where there is no formal
agreement by two or more parties, incidents of alleged misconduct have usually been scrutinized on an ad hoc basis. If the
action of the parties raises the inference that it is part of a plan
or scheme to interfere with or destroy competition, the element
of agreement will be deemed to be present.
The concept of conscious parallelism has been used by
many courts as the ultimate test, while other courts have cautioned of the dangers of inferring agreement from the sole fact
that more than one party has reached and acted on a similar
business decision at the same time, or under a like set of circumstances. While it seems safe to say that a refusal to deal with
another party will not be enjoined merely because another businessman simultaneously made the same decision through an independent determination, it must also be remembered that such
similar decisions are likely to cause a court to be more thorough
and cautious in its analysis. Moreover, knowledge of the second
party's action may cast further suspicion on a refusal to deal,
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since when a number of enterprises follow a similar course of
action in the knowledge and contemplation that they are all acting alike, they have, in effect, formed an agreement. There have
been no rigid criteria for defining agreement under the Sherman
Act, which is perhaps the most positive characteristic of the case
law on the subject and the most encouraging indicator that the
judicial approach will continue to be thorough and equitable.
SELF-RESTRICTING REFUSALS TO DEAL

In discussing concerted refusals to deal, this article has thus
far concentrated on the more aggressive forms of group activity.
Courts tend to deal more harshly with group behavior initiated
with the purpose or effect of applying direct coercion on a third
party trader.87 In an attempt to further illustrate the importance
of the element of coercion, it is essential to examine the more
passive form of group business behavior, the self-restricting refusal to deal.
When the element of direct coercion is lacking, courts have
set wider limits and broadened the scope of analysis before
reaching a determination of the legality of business agreements. 88 Good examples occur where trade associations limit
the availability of their services or products to their members, or
establish rules for governing the conduct of their members. 89
For the most part, these forms of behavior do not involve combining for the primary purpose of coercion or exclusion, but
rather represent combinations directly to further legitimate
business objectives of the parties involved. Any effect of their
conduct on third parties is, for the most part, indirect. The issue
in this class of cases does not seem to be the existence or nonexistence of an agreement or conspiracy; rather, it is whether the
purpose and effect of the combination unreasonably excludes
others from their right to participate in the market in question.
Generally, this type of case is not approached from an illegal per
se perspective9 °
87. See notes 59-81 and accompanying text supra.
88. See, e.g., District of Columbia Citizen Publishing Co. v. Merchants

and Mfrs. Ass'n, 83 F. Supp. 994 (D.D.C. 1949) (complaint failed to state facts
tending to show that defendants had attempted to monopolize any part of
interstate commerce within prohibition of Sherman Act).
89. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (interstate and foreign news services); Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (grain trade).

90. Even though the Court in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1 (1945), enjoined a self-restricting concerted refusal to deal, this did not

mean that self-restricting refusals to deal were per se violations of the Sherman Act. The Court stated that this type of refusal to deal was invalid only
when considered in light of the membership provision.
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An early case was Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v.
United States.91 In 1906, the Board adopted a "call rule"
whereby members were prohibited from purchasing or offering
to purchase any commodities during the time before the close of
the "call" 92 and the opening of the session on the next business
day at a price lower than that day's closing bid. In 1913, the government brought suit against the Board to enjoin enforcement
of the rule, alleging that it violated the Sherman Act. In reversing the district court's injunction, the Supreme Court found the
"call rule" to be a reasonable regulation of business consistent
with the provisions of the Sherman Act. 93 Thus, although individual members of the association were restricted as to the
purchase price of the commodities after the closing bid had
been made, the policy was seen as a reasonable form of self regulation. Even though there had to be an adverse effect on free
and open competition because all prices were frozen after the
"call," and a consequent restraint of trade, the Court felt that
this restraint would ultimately promote competition and was
therefore legitimate.
From Chicago Board of Trade until 1944, the distinction between self restriction and coercion appears to have been the dividing line between illegal and legal activity in this area.94 Then,
in 1945, the Supreme Court decided Associated Press v. United
States.95 The district court held-that the AP's bylaws unlawfully
restricted admission to membership in the Association. The bylaws also violated antitrust law insofar as their provisions
clothed members with the power to impose or dispense with the
conditions for membership of business competitors. In affirming, the Supreme Court said that the Sherman Act was
designed to prohibit independent businesses from becoming associates in a common plan which was bound to reduce their
competitors' opportunity to buy and sell news. The Court stated
that these bylaws, especially the provisions giving members the
means to block a competitor's admission, did not constitute one
of the "normal and usual agreements in aid of trade and commerce" 96 which may escape coverage by the Sherman Act.
The decree in Associated Press was not a mandate to the AP
to serve all applicants, it was a ban on its practice of discriminat91. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
92. For a further explanation of the "call rule" see note 47 supra.
93. 246 U.S. at 238.
94. See Comment, Concerted Refusals to Deal. A Per Se Violation of the
Sherman Act?, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1956).
95. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
96. Id. at 19, citing Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914).
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ing against competitors of its members. In a vigorous dissent,
Justice Murphy expressed his view that the members of the AP
were entirely within their legal rights in forming a cooperative
organization with facilities for the collection and exchange of
news, and in limiting the membership therein. He stated that
members of an unincorporated society should be allowed, as a
general rule, to extend or withhold membership as they see fit,
and that the majority was using the Sherman Act to outlaw a
reasonable competitive advantage without the evils that Con97
gress attempted to eradicate by the enactment of the statute.
The Associated Press decision has been the subject of much
discussion and criticism. Some critics felt the Court's decision
extended the Sherman Act, in view of the government's position
that contractual denial of a member's freedom to deal with
whomever he pleased in the disposal of his own product constituted a primary boycott of nonmembers. 98 However, it should
be noted the Court did not renounce its holding in Chicago
Board of Trade, since the rules and regulations relative to the
members' conduct in gathering and supplying news was not declared illegal. The case turned instead on the bylaws provision
which made it possible arbitrarily to bar entrance of competitors
into the association.
The treatment accorded these self-restricting forms of group
action can readily be distinguished from the more commonly litigated case where there is a predatory purpose to coerce third
parties directly to injure competition. The effect of the agreements in self-restricting refusals to deal is usually the creation
of more efficient control of a group's conduct to maximize overall operational efficiency; any coercive effect on a competitor's
business opportunity is generally incidental. Even in Associated
Press, the Court refused to regard the exclusionary provision as
illegal per se. It apparently felt the field of illegal per se restraints was confined to market price arrangements and certain
types of monopolization. The final decision was reached only after the rule of reason had been applied. The Court consequently
broadened its inquiry into the total scope of the group's activity,
balancing the positive effect on the association itself against the
public interest. 99
97. Id. at 49 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
98. See Lewin, The Associated Press Decision-An Extension of the
Sherman Act?, 13 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (1946).
99. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). The primary obstacle to a combination's attempt
to consolidate its efforts in pursuing mutual business objectives has been
the illegal per se doctrine. However, once this hurdle has been successfully
negotiated, defendants will have an opportunity to invoke a balancing of
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The trade exchange and association cases are not an exception to the general rule of placing rigid limitations on group activity, but are distinguishable because the presumed purpose of
eliminating competition is replaced by an improvement of public service. This area, having broad public interest implications,
requires a careful balancing of competing interests within the
framework of the rule of reason.
JUSTIFICATION FOR REFUSING TO DEAL

In dealing with the courts' treatment of refusals to deal
under the antitrust laws, this article has attempted to analyze
the case law in terms of the various approaches and criteria
used to implement the objectives of promoting and safeguarding
free and open competition. This analysis has shown that group
boycotts or concerted refusals to deal have repeatedly been
struck down when the requisite agreement, either formal or constructive, can be proven. The presence of an intent or purpose
to coerce has had the ultimate effect of limiting the scope of judicial inquiry, and thus of expediting the complainant's attempt to
invoke the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. Although the individual trader, acting independently and without a monopolistic
position or scheme, has an absolute right to refuse to deal, absolute prohibitions against all group activity in this area have been
less consistent. 10 0 The final issue to be discussed is whether the
courts should entertain a defendant's contention that the agreement to which it has been found a party is a justifiable exercise
of an otherwise illegal course of conduct and, if so, to what extent the defense of justification will take such group activity out
of the prohibitory scope of the Sherman Act.
Where the issue of justification arises, the defendant is usually found by the court to have entered into an agreement as
defined by sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act. He then attempts to convince the court either that his actions were necessary to the exercise of an ultimately legitimate business
function, or that the agreement was necessary to eradicate some
existing business evil. Such a contention was dismissed by the
Supreme Court in Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'Association v. United States.1 1 The Court said the defendants' argument-that their action was necessary to protect retail trade and
promote the public welfare by providing retail facilities-was
interests approach. This comprehensive treatment offers a better opportu-

nity for success.
100. See notes 101-14 and accompanying text infra.
101. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
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countered by the Sherman Act, and that private choice must
10 2
yield to national authority.
Although in later cases the Court did not specifically speak
in terms of justification, it left the question less clear. For example, in Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc.' 0 3 the Supreme Court,
in dicta, said:
Although by itself the charge that the defendants conspired to ruin
the plaintiff's business might constitute an illegal purpose, yet,
when stated in conjunction with facts which show that this was not
the purpose of the alleged concerted action of defendants, it becomes clear that, even if ruination of plaintiff's business resulted
from the acts of the defendants in the protection of their own business, if these acts were lawful, that result was a mere incident of a
means and gave rise to no cause
lawful purpose, executed by lawful
04
of action against defendants.
The Court avoided any discussion of justification, based on defendants' contention that their actions were necessary for the
preservation of business, by finding the purpose and therefore
the means used in protection of the business to be lawful. Moreover, in a 1932 case, the Supreme Court also implied that the use
of self help in business conduct might be legitimate in certain
circumstances notwithstanding some adverse effect or restraint
on an individual competitor. 0 5 The Court stated: "Voluntary
action to rescue and preserve these [competitive] opportunities,
and thus to aid in relieving a depressed industry and in reviving
commerce by placing competition upon a sounder basis, may be
more efficacious than an attempt to provide remedies through
legal processes. 10 6 Once again, no mention is made of possible
excuses or justification for illegal (agreement) conduct, and it is
not clear whether or not the Court felt that the negative implications of agreement could be effectively neutralized, within the
purview of the Sherman Act, by the ultimate purpose of combatting business evils. The Court seemed to avoid the issue of justification of an otherwise unlawful combination or conspiracy by
102. Id. at 613. See also Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211, 241-42 (1899) (an agreement which regulates interstate commerce
"trenches upon the power of the national legislature and violates the statute").
103. 263 U.S. 291 (1923).
104. Id. at 300-01. See also American Steel Co. v. American Steel &Wire
Co., 244 F. 300, 303 (D. Mass. 1916) (in an action for damages under the Sher-

man Act against an illegal monopoly, the plaintiffs declaration must sufficiently describe the conditions in the trade in question, the alleged
conspiracy or combination, and the business of the plaintiff so that the

court can see that this alleged conspiracy or combination, and its act, have
affected the general conditions in the trade, and that plaintiff's business and
situation were such that it might have been damaged by its conduct).
105. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
106. Id. at 374.
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entertaining the facts that might lead to such a determination
before deciding the legality of the group activity in question.
In Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States,10 7 the Supreme
Court once again discussed in dicta the various circumstances
under which concerted action directed toward self help might be
valid:
Designed to frustrate unreasonable restraints, [restrictions imposed by the Sherman Act] . . . do not prevent the adoption of reasonable means to protect interstate commerce from destructive or
injurious practices and to promote competition upon a sound basis .... Accordingly we have held that a cooperative enterprise
otherwise free from objection, which carries with it no monopolistic
menace, is not to be condemned as an undue restraint merely because it may effect a change in market conditions where the change
not impair,
would be in mitigation of recognized evils and would
08
but rather foster, fair competitive opportunities.1
However, the Court cautioned that freedom of concerted action
to improve conditions has definite limitations: a desirable end
does not justify illegal means, and the attempt to eradicate illicit
businegs practices must not itself become illicit. The Court continued: "As the statute draws the line at unreasonable restraints, a cooperative endeavor which transgresses that line
cannot justify itself by pointing to evils afflicting the industry or
to a laudable purpose to remove them."'10 9
This rationale has apparently provided the framework
within which later attempts at justification defenses have been
considered. If the group activity involves an element of obvious
coercion and the requisite agreement under section 1 can be
found, the negative effects of the means used, with their anticompetitive implications, will generally be found to offset the legitimate end of eradicating recognized business evils.
This conclusion appears valid in light of Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC. 10 In this case, defendants
contended that their action did not violate section 5 of the FTC
Act because its sole consequence was to curb the unlawful competition of alleged style pirates. Defendants argued that a person's interest in his business was a subject of protection against
unlawful invasion by others, and that the antitrust laws could
not be interpreted as barring all self help to a trader. The Court
found the defendant's business practice of refusing all sales to
manufacturers and retailers of garments who dealt in the copies
illegal, emphasizing the Guild's dominant market position and
297 U.S. 553 (1936).
108. Id. at 597-98.
107.

109. Id. at 599.

110. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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interpreting the aim of the combination as intentional destruction of a competitor's business. Furthermore, the Court said,
even if style copying were an acknowledged common law tort,
the defendants would not be justified in utilizing self help to
force these competitiors out of the market.1 1 '
Another aspect of the justification issue has arisen where
the Sherman Act has come into conflict with the express provisions of another federal law. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange 112 the Supreme Court addressed itself specifically to the
defendants' argument that their concerted action was justified
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.113 The New York
Stock Exchange, pursuant to the rules it had adopted under the
Act of 1934, ordered a number of its members to remove private
direct telephone connections previously in operation between
the offices of these members and the plaintiff, a nonmember.
The Court found this to be a concerted refusal to deal which,
absent any 'justification derivedfrom the policy of anotherstatute or otherwise ,' ' n 4 constituted a Sherman Act violation. Defendants claimed that their action was authorized by the
Securities Exchange Act's policy of self-regulation by private
exchanges, and that the Sherman Act was preempted. The
Court recognized that certain reasonable regulations might supersede the Sherman Act's provisions against agreements in restraint of trade, and said that the act of self-regulation must be
consistent with traditional antitrust concepts, under the aegis of
the rule of reason. The collective refusal here was found not to
be justified since petitioners were not informed of the charges
underlying the Exchange's action, and were not given an opportunity to refute or explain such charges.
Although the Court hinted in Silver that there might be justification for a concerted refusal under circumstances other than
conflicting statutory provisions or policy, no such possible conditions were mentioned. In fact, Justice Goldberg, speaking for
the majority, said:
There is also no need for us to define further whether the interposing of a substantive justification in an antitrust suit brought to challenge a particular enforcement of the rules on its merits is to be
governed by a standard of arbitrariness, good faith, reasonableness,
or some other measure. It will be time enough
to deal with that
115
problem if and when the occasion arises.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 468.
373 U.S. 341 (1963).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
373 U.S. at 348-49 (emphasis added).
Id. at 365-66.
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The issue of whether there is a valid justification for a concerted refusal to deal remains undetermined. Very seldom do
courts talk expressly about "justification." Instead, it appears
that courts consider facts relevant to the issue of legitimate excuse or mitigation before they reach an ultimate decision as to
the legality of the activity in question. Therefore, justification
really is included in a consideration of reasonableness of the activity in question, resulting from an implementation of the rule
of reason. If coercion is absent and the agreement and subsequent conduct by the group are not patently offensive, and if the
ultimate goals of the concerted action are economically desirable and justifiable, the activity may be found to lie outside the
Sherman Act prohibitions in that the restraint of trade may not
be sufficient to warrant judicial intrusion. If the courts find sufficient reasons to declare the combination or conspiracy illegal,
the chances for preventing an order to discontinue such conduct
(and other relief) based on a claim of justification seem unfavorable.
CONCLUSION

By defining the scope of a trader's right to customer selection, courts have tried to interpret congressional intent as expressed in the words of the antitrust laws. These laws,
especially the Sherman Act, are intentionally broad. A result of
this generality has been the problem of deciding what specific
kinds of business activity were sought to be prohibited. This
task has involved an attempt to balance public interest with private rights-to encourage individual freedom to pursue competitive opportunities, while safeguarding the viability and
dynamism of the competitive market structure. Ultimately, this
process has necessitated a determination or definition of the
point where individual or group conduct begins to encroach unreasonably on the general right of all others to participate in the
market. It is at this point that private right must yield to public
will.
Generally, the decisions in the field of group boycotts have
evaluated refusals to deal in the business setting in which they
occur. The intent of Congress has been interpreted as authorizing (and encouraging) the absolute right of an individual, acting
unilaterally and nonmonopolistically, to refuse to deal with any
116
other person or entity for any reason sufficient to himself.
This complete freedom of the individual is the most fundamental component of continued economic development, and is seen
as the very embodiment of competitive vitality. Conversely, a
116. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text supra.
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decision to refuse to deal made in concert with others or in furtherance of a monopoly is viewed as a threat to the principles of
equal competitive opportunity, and .is consequently treated
harshly. 117 The concept of strength in numbers is deeply rooted
in American economic philosophy, and such increased strength
apparently breeds apprehension when it is potentially exercisable in a predatory or coercive manner. This attitude toward concerted action has also become entrenched in the antitrust
theory of American jurisprudence, and has been reflected in the
traditionally cautious attitude of the courts toward group activity.
A businessman must initially determine whether he will
deal at all with particular buyers or customers and, as we have
seen, may encounter a broad range of implicit antitrust provisions. He must be prepared to demonstrate that his conduct is
purely arbitrary and noncollusive, and represents a lawful exercise of business judgment. If he can do so, his refusal to deal
will invariably withstand a Sherman Act challenge.
For the most part, courts have made a discerning market
analysis of refusals to deal in an attempt to reconcile the preservation of legitimate individual business discretion with the protection of free enterprise from monopolistic tendencies and
restraints of trade. The approach to defining Sherman Act
agreements has, absent an element of direct coercion, been
characterized by a thorough evaluation of all relevant market
factors through the rule of reason. A similar approach has been
adopted to decide what restraints of trade are necessarily evil
and therefore unlawful. It seems well settled that a failure to
commence or continue business relationships may be a functional decision based on business judgment, and as such may be
absolutely legitimate. But it is equally true that a refusal can be
a tool of monopoly power and can, if effectively used and left
unchecked, prevent equal access to channels of business opportunity that must be left free and open if competition is to survive. Viewed in the context of reasonable bounds of business
behavior, this latter refusal is inherently incompatible with antitrust objectives. Individual freedom to trade should not be allowed to encompass a right to preclude others from the right to
that same opportunity, for if it is, the very existence and perpetuation of competition are necessarily jeopardized.
The development of the case law during the past seventy
years has resulted from a judicial attempt to achieve an appropriate and lasting balance between the preservation of an indi117. See notes 67-86 and accompanying text supra.
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vidual's freedom to deal, and protection of the public from
undue restraints. The principles and analytical criteria created
by the courts have resulted from a logical consideration of the
interests that must be protected, and the very flexibility of the
standards and tests developed ensure a continued case-by-case
approach that will not only provide the individual with a guarantee of future latitude in permissible business conduct, but will
also ensure the continued growth of a viable and free economy.

